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Efficiency Wages and the Wage Structure
ABSTRACT
This paper examines differences in pay for equally skilled workers in
different industries. The major finding is that there is substantial
dispersion in wages across industries, even after allowing for measured and
unmeasured labor quality, working conditions, fringe benefits, transitory
demand shocks, threat of unionization, union bargaining power, firm size and
other factors. Some direct evidence in favor of efficiency wage theories is
presented. The evidence suggests that industry wage differentials are
successful in eliciting better performance through reduced turnover and
increased effort.
Alan B. Krueger Lawrence H. Summers
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Harvard University Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138The essential feature of a perfectly competitive labor market is that
workers who accept jobs can expect to receive compensation equal to their
opportunity cost. Firms pay a wage that is just sufficient to attract
workers of the quality they desire and no higher.Competitive theory makes a
strong prediction about the structure of wages. Job attributes which do not
directly affect the utility of workers should have no effect on the level of
wages. Alternative theories such as the efficiency wage formulations surveyed
by Stiglitz (1984) suggest that job attributes having nothing to do with the
utility workers receive on the job should have systematic effects onwages
because they influence the optimal wage for firms to choose. As Stiglitz
(1984), Bulow and Summers (1986) and many other authors have argued,
efficiency wage theories have positive and normative implications very
different from those of more standard competitive models.
This paper examines the magnitude of non—competitivewage differentials.
We focus on the role of industry and occupational variables in explaining
relative wages. Our findings suggest that a worker's industry and occupation
exert a substantial impact on his wage even after controlling for human
capital and a variety of job characteristics. We are led to conclude that
there are important variations in wages which cannot be explained by standard
competitive theories. These findings complement demonstrations of important
relationships between firm size and wages, Brown and Medoff (1984), and of
large intra—industry wage differences, Dunlop (1957) and Groshen (1986) in
suggesting the importance of developing models of non—competitive wage setting
even in non—union settings.—2—
We focus on efficiency wage theories as an explanation for the setting of
non—competitive wages. Any economic theory that explains why wages deviate
from their competitive level must in a tautologous sense explain why firms
find it profitable to pay non-competitive wages. In this sense, any
explanation of non-competitive wages must have an efficiency wage element.
That is, it must postulate that over some range profits are an increasing
function of the wage rate offered. In some cases, the efficiency wage theory
is a triviality. For example, firms may find it unprofitable to violate
minimum wage laws because of the fines that will be imposed. Or it may be
necessary to pay supra-competitive wages to unionized workers in order to
avoid strikes. Our principle interest is however in "pure" efficiency wage
models in which firms can find it profitable to raise wages even when they
will not be punished by some outside party for failing to do so. The limited
evidence that is available suggests that high paying industries may benefit by
reducing turnover and eliciting more effort from their workers as suggested by
efficiency wage theories.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the
possible role of efficiency wage theories in explaining wage differentials.
Section 2 presents our basic econometric results using data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) and documents the existence of substantial inter—
industry and inter—occupational variations in wages. Section 3 considers and
rejects a number of possible reconciliations of the results with competitive
theory. By providing fixed effects estimates we cast serious doubt on
"unmeasured labor quality" explanations for inter-industry wage differences.
We also present evidence strongly suggesting that wage differentials cannot—3—
all be attributed to union effects, the shortrun immobility of labor or
compensating differentials. Section 4 provides some evidencethat high wages
are efficacious in eliciting effort from workers andreducing turnover and
thus provides some support for efficiencywage theories. Section 5 concludes
the paper by reviewing some broader evidenceon the importance of industry
wage differentials, and by reviewing evidence on the importance of these
differentials for economic theory and policy.
1.Efficiency Wage Theories
Economists have a clear understanding of howperfectly competitive labor
markets without any information or contractingproblems would function.
Equally productive workers would receive compensation package whichprovided
equal levels of utility. Wages would depend only on worker& abilitiesand
not on characteristics of their employers which did not influenceother
non—pecuniary benefits of employment. Falsification of this prediction would
force consideration of alternative theories thatpredict linkages between job
characteristics and wages. Any such theory has theproperty that at least
some employers must be paying more than the goingwage for workers of the type
they attract. This behavior can be rationalized only byassuming that some
= firmsdo not profit maximize, or that some firms find thatincreasing wages
above the going rate is profitable. The latterpossibility is the defining
characteristic of efficiency wage theories.
At least four conceptually distinct efficiencywage theories may be
adduced as possible rationales for the payment ofnon-competitive wages. Our-4-
goal in this paper is to demonstrate the potential importance of efficiency
wages not to distinguish between alternative motives for paying them. We
therefore describe these motives only briefly. For formal presentations of
the relevant models, and references to the relevant literature, see Stiglitz
(1984) and Katz (1986). The profitability of raising wages at least in some
circumstances has been asserted by many authors including Adam Smith, Karl
Marx, Alfred Marshall, Henry Ford and Max Weber.
A first model of efficiency wages postulates that they are paid in order
to minimize turnover costs.If firms must bear part of the costs of turnover,
and if turnover is a decreasing function of the wages firms pay, there may be
an incentive to raise wages in order to minimize turnover costs.
A second possibility is that increasing wages raises workers effort
level. Workers who are paid only their opportunity costs have little
incentive to perform well since losing their job would not be costly. By
raising wages, firms may make the cost of job loss larger and thereby
encourage good performance.
Alternatively, a third model postulates that workers' feelings of loyalty
to their firm increase with the extent to which the firms shares its profits
with them. These feelings of loyalty may have a direct effect on
productivity. As expounded by Akerlof (1984) such a model relies on notions
about gift relationships that are not well captured by traditional utility
functions.
A final model is based on selection rather than incentive effects.
Firms which pay higher wages will find that they attract a higher quality pool
of applicants. If quality is not directly observable, this will be desirable.-5—
If all firms or occupations were identical, one would notexpect to see
differentfirms or occupations paying different wages even ifefficiency wage
considerations were important. But when there are differences in their
ability to bear the costs of turnover, to supervise their workers, or to
measure labor quality, either because of differences in management capacity,
or because of differences in the technology of production, then the optimal
wage to pay will vary. Thus efficiency wage models unlike standard
competitive formulations can explain why characteristics of firms or
occupations which do not directly affect workers' utility can affectwage
rates.
It should be clear that demonstrations that similar workers canover long
periods of time be paid different wages in different industries makes
plausible the idea that some workers are involuntarily unemployed, for
involuntary unemployment can simply be thought of as confinement to a lowwage
home production industry.
Previous Studies
Previous studies have examined the effect an employee's industry or
occupation has on wages to test segmented labor market theories that are
closely related to the efficiency wage model considered here. Sumner Slichter
(1950) was among the first economists to study the industry wage structure.
After examining the average hourly wage rate of skilled and unskilled male
workers in manufacturing industries between 1923 and 1946, Slichter was struck
by the magnitude of industry wage differences for comparable workers.
Slichter found several "regularities" in the wage structure. First, he-6-
found the average unskilled wage rate in an industry to vary positively with
the average hourly earnings of semi-skilled and skilled workers in the industry.
Second, he found that industry wages are positively correlated with value
added per worker in the industry, positively correlated with profit margins,
and negatively correlated with the payroll to income ratio.And lastly, he
found that "the wage structure changes over time, but the changes are fairly
slow and the wage structure between industries within a period of twenty or
thirty years exhibits only moderate changes." Slichter theorized that these
facts were evidence that "managerial policy" is important in wage setting.
Thurow (1976) phrases the question as follows: "Earnings data and
earnings equations are often corrected for both industry and geographic
location, but should they be? Wage payments in a marginal-productivity world
are supposed to be made on the basis of the skills supplied and not dependent
upon the industry or region of use." The answer he finds is that "industry
and geographic variables are significant in individual earnings functions....
This significance, itself, constitutes a deviation from the norms of a
competitive market."
Using regression analysis, Wachtel and Betsey (1972) analyze the impact
of one digit industries and three occupation groups on the residual ofwages
after controlling for education, experience and demographic factors. Like
Thurow they conclude that "there is a substantial portion of the variance in
wage earnings that can be explained by industry structure after the effects of
personal characteristics have been eliminated." They further find that an
employee's industry and occupation pair is more "important" in explaining
wages than other "structural characteristics," such as union status and—7—
geographic location.
After carefully reviewing theempirical studies on dual labor market
theory, Cain (1976) concludes that the importance ofindustry affiliation in
determining wages is the most convincing evidence insupport of dual labor
markets.l However, Cain aptly cautionsthat the industry effects onwages
"may represent transitory demand factors,compensating nonpecuniary effects,
or unmeasured human capital variables." Thesepossibilities have not been
adequately addressed in the existing empirical studiespurporting to establish
the importance of labor market separation.
The empirical work reported below takesup Cain's challenge and examines
possible competitive explanations forinter—industry wage differences. We
also extend previous work by testingefficiency wage explanations for the
existence of segmented labor markets.
2. Data, Methodology, and Basic Results
In textbook neoclassical labor economicsan employee is compensated
according to his or her opportunity cost, which is determinedby accumulated
human capital and the employer's work environment.If an employee's industry
or occupation is a significant factor indetermining wages after controlling
for labor quality and working conditionswe must look beyond simple
competitive theories and ask why firms choose topay workers more than their
opportunity cost.
Our initial empirical analysis of industry andoccupational wage
differentials is based on cross sectional dataon individuals collected by the—8—
Bureau of the Census for the May 1974, 1979 and 1984 Current Population
Surveys. The May CPS contains labor force data for members of the sampled
households who are 14 years old or older.In May 1979 the Bureau of the
Census asked additional questions on tenure, firm size, plant size, and fringe
benefits of a randomly selected sample of households for its Pension
Supplement. All of our results for 1979 are based on the Pension
Supplement.2 The samples we analyze contain full and part—time private
nonagricultural employees 16 years old or older. The earnings variable is
usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. We consideredemployees
who reported earning less than $1.00 or greater than $250.00 an hour outliers
and eliminated them from the sample.
We estimate several standard wage equations in order to examine the
importance of industry and occupation in explaining relative wages. Our
strategy is to control for human capital, demographic background and working
conditions as well as possible, and then analyze the effect of industry and
occupation dummy variables on relative wages. We normalize the estimated
industry and occupation wage differentials as deviations from the (weighted)
mean differential.3
Table 1 presents results of cross section regressions of logwage on one
digit census industries (CIC) with human capital and demographic controls for
1974, 1979, and 1984. The human capital and demographic controls include
education, age, sex, race, union status, a central city dummy, maritalstatus,
veteran status, and several interaction terms.4 Table 2presents comparable
results for two—digit CXC industries and Appendix Table Al containscomparable
results for 1984 for three digit dc industries. As agroup the industry-9—
dummy variables are statistically significant and theyare generally
significant individually.
Furthermore, the industry variables have a sizable impact on relative
wages. The coefficient for mining in Table 2 for 1984, for instance, implies
that the average employee in the mining industryearns wages that are 26*
higher than the average employee in all industries, aftercontrolling for
human capital and demographic background. In 1964 theindustry differentials
ranged from a high of 38* above the mean in the petroleum industry toa low of
37% below the mean in private household services. Thesewage differentials
suggest that other factors besides opportunity cost are important in
explaining wages.
The industry and occupation variables arevery important in explaining
variations in log earnings. As an indication of their importance, the
standard error of the regression falls nearly 10% when theindustry and
occupation controls are added to the equation, and two digit industry controls
alone lead to 4.5% reduction in the standard error of theregression after
controlling for occupation and other factors. In comparison, the union
variable only has a 1.5* effect on the standard error of theregression, the
human capital controls have only a 4.4* effect, and race andsex controls have
less than a .2% effect. This suggests that if industry andoccupational wage
differences are non—competitive they have far greater impacts on the
allocation of resources than do the wage differences associated with unionsor
discrimination.
Some general observations can be made about the industry wage structure.
Durable manufacturing products and chemical industries tend to be highwageTable 1: Estimated Wage Differentials for One-Digit Industries
May CPS




































































Deviation of Differentialsb .097 .069 .094 .125
Sample Size 29,945 8,978 10,289 10,283
acontrols include education and its square, 6 age dummies, 8 occupation
dummies, sex dummy, race dummy, central city dummy, union member dummy, ever
married dummy, veteran status; marriage x sex interaction, education x sex
interaction, education squared x sex interaction, and 6 age x sex
interactions.












Mining .203 .263 .262 0.274
(.022) (.031) (.035) (.036)
Construction .228 .137 .153 0.140
(.011) (.016) (.022) (.022)
Ordnance .202 .091 .115 NA
(.040) (.067) (.118) NA
Lumber .003 —.035 —.048 —0.011
(.021) (.037) (.045) (.045)
Furniture —.059 —.120 —.033 —0.013
(.025) (.036) (.052) (.052)
Stone&Clay .032 .052 .082 0.135
(.022) (.034) (.051) (.051)
Primary Metals .082 .114 .170 0.270
(.016) (.026) (.041) (.041)
Fabricated Metals .051 .039 .061 0.122
(.015) (.026) (.036) (.036)
Machinery, excl. elec. .083 .092 .187 0.223
(.013) (.022) (.025) (.025)
Electrical Machinery .oss .045 .105 0.134
(.013) (.021) (.027) (.027)
Transport Equipment .120 .156 .087 0.263
(.014) (.021) (.027) (.027)
Instruments .oas .137 .131 0.150
(.025) (.040) (.042) (.042)
Misc. Manufacturing —.116 —.110 .001 0.021
(.024) (.042) (.054) (.054)
Food .010 .019 .072 0.125












Tobacco —.007 —.040 .294 0.482
(.063) (.156) (.113) (.173)
Apparel -.087 -.132 —.156 —0.152
(.016) (.030) (.033) (.033)
Paper .057 .088 .126 0.163
(.020) (.033) (.042) (.042)
Printing .052 .039 .083 0.087
(.017) (.028) (.029) (.029)
Chemical .157 .148 .238 0.283
(.018) (.029) (.034) (.034)
Petroleum .238 .218 .382 0.631
(.036) (.052) (.077) (.077)
Rubber .007 .023 .035 0.079
(.021) (.036) (.043) (.043)
Leather —.097 —.233 —.125 —0.106
(.034) (.051) (.062) (.062)
Railroad .200 .120 NA NA
(.023) (.037)
Other Transport .090 .120 .161 0.190
(.014) (.022) (.026) (.028)
Communications .159 .064 .194 0.317
(.016) (.027) (.030) (.030)
Public Utilities .138 .068 .287 0.364
(.021) (.028) (.033) (.033)
Wholesale Trade .035 —.015 .065 0.043
(.012) (.020) (.022) (.022)
Eating & Drinking —.267 —.125 —.188 —0.218
(.012) (.020) (.023) (.023)
Other Retail —.141 —.093 —.156 —0.187












Banking .081 -.063 .077 0.105
(.014) (.031) (.023) (.023)
Insurance .048 .022 .080 0.084
(.013) (.027) (.022) (.022)
Private Household —.151 —.259 —.367 -0.517
(.019) (.034) (.101) (.101)
Business Services —.053 —.057 .013 -0.017
(.016) (.028) (.024) (.024)
Repair Services -.126 —.026 —.007 -0.038
(.021) (.032) (.036) (.036)
Personal Services —.216 —.107 -.163 —0.202
(.015) (.025) (.026) (.026)
Entertainment —.145 -.078 —.143 -0.165
(.023) (.036) (.036) (.038)
Medical Services —.052 —.039 —.073 —0.069
(.015) (.022) (.024) (.024)
Hospitals .039 .063 .064 0.068
(.013) (.018) (.023) (.023)
Welfare Services —.333 -.190 —.254 -0.338
(.022) (.032) (.028) (.023)
Education Services —.127 —.185 —.189 -0.211
(.016) (.019) (.029) (.027)
Professional Services .oas .060 .071 0.032
(.016) (.029) (.027) (.027)
Unbiased Weighted Standard
Deviation of Premiums .132 .108 .146 .185
Note: Controls and sample sizes are the same as in Table1.-10-
industries while wholesale, retail and service industries tend to be low wage
industries, In 1984, for instance, workers in the capital intensive,
technologically sophisticated chemical industry were paid 24% percent above
the average employee, while workers in the customer oriented retail trade
industries were paid 16% to 19% less than the average employee, all else
constant.
To summarize the overall variability in industry wages we focus on the
standard deviation of the industry wage differentials. A simple calculation
of the standard deviation of the estimated industry differentials is upwardly
biased because the industry differentials cannot be estimated precisely. We
therefore adjust the standard deviation of estimated ceofficients to reflect
sampling error.5
Industry variations in relative wages are substantial. In 1984 the
employment—weighted standard deviation of two digit CXC industry wage
differentials was almost 15%, in 1979 the standard deviation was 11%, and in
1974 the standard deviation was 13%. Changing industries has about the same
impact on wages as does changing union status, on average.
Focusing on occupation rather than industry, Table 3 shows that
occupation wage differentials are also large. in 1984, wage premiums ranged
from a high of 22% above the mean for managers and administrators to a low of
21% below the mean for transport operatives. The standard deviation of the
occupational wage differentials in that year was about 12%. As was the case
with the industry wage differentials, the occupation premiums are highly
correlated from year to year.Table 3: Estimated Wage Differentials for Occupations
May CR5

































































Standard Deviation .107 .085
acontrols are the same as in Table 1.
bsamples sizes for 1974, 1979, and 1984 are 29,945, 8,978 and 10,294,
respectively.—11—
Non-Wage Compensation
Fringe benefits are an important component of compensation, accounting
for as much as 40% to 50% of total compensation in some companies. To adjust
for variation in fringes across industries, we multiplied the CPS hourlywage
data for each worker by the ratio of total labor costs to wages in the
corresponding industry. The industry labor cost and wage data are reported in
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
The results of wage regressions with the dependent variable adjusted to
reflect nonwage compensation are reported in column (4) of Tables 1 and 2.
Since the NIPA and CPS classification schemes do not match perfectly, care
should be used in comparing these results to the CPS results. Nonetheless,
Tables 1 and 2 show that consideration of nonwage compensation reinforces
rather than reduces industries wage differences. For instance, thewage
differential in primary metals increases from 17 above the mean to 27% above
the mean when we take account of nonwage compensation.
Wage Differences Through Time
Over time both the one and two digit CIC industries show a stable pattern
of inter—industry wage variability. The standard deviation ofwage
differentials shows no trend during the years we studied and the differentials
are highly correlated from year to year. Between 1984 and 1919 the
correlation is .998 and between 1964 and 1974 the correlation is .970. As
further evidence of the stability of the inter-industrywage structure over
time, Krueger and Summers (1986) find a correlation of .56 between the
industry wage differentials for 1984 and the average wage of unskilled male—12—
manufacturing workers in 1923. Like Slichter,we conclude that the industry
wage structure remains constant over time.
The stability of the industrywage structure casts doubt on explanations
of wage differentials based on theshort run immobility of labor,transitory
labor demand shocks, and rentsharing. it is unlikely that labor is
sufficiently immobile over several decades oreven one decade to allow such
large differentials to persist. And stock marketdata suggest that the rents
available in different industries fluctuatewidely through time. The standard
deviation in stock market return between1984 and 1979 of 23 selected
industries surveyed by Standard and Poor1swas 78%. The great variability in
rents available in an industry over time wouldmake a rent-sharing explanation
of the industry wage differences implausible.
in contrast to the predictions of thecompetitive model, we find that the
industry or occupation an employee is in has astatistically significant and
sizable impact on wages. Furthermore, theserelative wage differentials
persist at about the same level over time, which isinconsistent with
explanations based on the short run immobility oflabor, transitory demand
shocks, or rent sharing. Next we examine whetherthese findings hold up
under closer scrutiny.
3.Alternative Explanations of Industry WageDifferentials
In this section we examine whether the
substantial industry wage
differentials discussed in Section 2 can begiven competitive or institutional
explanations. This section is divided into four subsections.The firstconsiders issues of measured and unmeasured labor quality, the second examines
the importance of compensating differentials, the third section explores the
union threat effect, and the fourth section addresses other issues. The major
conclusion is that industry wage differentials are robust to additional
competitive and institutional explanations.
Labor Quality
Perhaps the most plausible competitive explanation for our findings is
that there are differences in unmeasured aspects of labor quality across
industries. Tables 4A and 46 explore the impact of alternative degrees of
control for human capital on inter—industry and occupation wage variation.
If industry wage differentials were due to measured and unmeasured labor
quality differences across industries we would expect a significant fall in
the dispersion of industry wages once we control for measured human capital.
However, the addition of human capital controls -—education,tenure, and age
——resultsin only a 1* drop in the standard deviation of the wage
differentials in the 1979 CPS Pension Supplement. Despite the increased
controls for labor quality the standard deviation of industry wages remains
above 10*. And variation in occupational wage differences is also substantial
despite increased labor quality controls. Unless one believes that age tenure
and schooling account for only a negligible amount of the variation in labor
quality, this evidence makes it implausible to attribute inter—industry wage
differences to differences in labor quantity.
It might still be argued that our results do not adequately control for
labor quality ——thatunmeasured labor quality differences, such as motivationTable 4A: Alternative Degrees of Control for LaborQuality —IndustryAnalysis










central city dummy, union
dummy, ever married, ever
married* sex, and veteran
status .114 .994
(2)Row (2) controls plus 12 age
structure variables .ioa .998
(3)Row (2) plus 4 education
variables .108 1.0
(4)Row (3)controls plus .
4 tenure variables .104 .995
Table 4B: Alternative Degrees of Control for LaborQuality -OccupationAnalysis









central city dummy, union
dummy, ever married, ever
married* sex, and veteran
status .111 .991
(2)Row (2)controls plus 12 age
structure variables .102 .992
(3)Row (2) plus 4 education
variables .085 1.0
(4)Row (3) controls plus
4 tenure variables .oai .999—14—
and innate ability, vary systematically with industry and are being
"picked—up" by the industry variables instead of the human capital controls.
We address the problem of unmeasured, unchanging labor quality by
analyzing longitudinal data. With these data we can compare the wages of the
same person as he or she switches industry. The longitudinal analysis
addresses the problem of unmeasured labor quality in the cross-sectional
results reported above, but is not without potential biases. These biases
include the selectivity of job switchers and increased measurement error.
We have created a large longitudinal data set by pooling together three
matched CPS data sets. Since CPS cannot match individuals who change their
address, the sample is not completely representative and probably
under-represents job switchers. Nonetheless, CPS reports that about 7O of
respondents were matched from one year to the next year. Of the 18,541
employees in our data set, 2,137 reported changing major industries. However,
evidence from Mellow and Sider (1983) on measurement error in answering
questions about industry suggests that many of these reported industry
switchers truly did not switch industry affiliation, and are instead the
result of classification errors. As a result, it is necessary to correct our
estimates for measurement error.
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis of longitudinal data. Since
measurement error is a severe problem in looking at persons who report changes
in industry, we report results with and without adjustment for measurement
error. The correction for measurement error in more than one dummy variable
in longitudinal data is derived in the Appendix. Our results show that the





Industry for Measurement ErrorsforMeasurement ErrorbLevelsc
Construction .063 .123 .176
(.033) (.074) (.023)
Manufacturing .028 .097 .059
(.031) (.012) (.021)
Transportation and .019 .229 .110
Public Utilities (.035) (.248) (.022)
Wholesale and -.042 —.093 —;126
Retail Trade (.031) (.074) (.021)
F.I.R.E. .027 —.132 .029
(.036) (.243) (.023)
Services —.040 —.164 —.070
(.032) (.010) (.022)
Mining .067 .193 .134
(.004) (.070) (.044)
aData set is three matched May CPS's pooledtogether. 1974-1975, 1977-1978 and
1979—1980. Sample size is 18,122.
bsee Appendix I for description of correctiontechnique.
cLevels are 1974, 1977 and 1979 data pooled. The1975, 1978 and 1980 sample
was qualitatively the same.
dControls for fixed effects regressions include change in education and its
square, change in occupation, change in union membership, change in experience
squared, change in marital status, change in veteran status and year dummies.
Controls for level regressions are the same as Table 1 plus year dummies.—15—
finance, insurance and real estate the level and adjusted longitudinal results
have the same sign and about the same magnitude. For instance, the
measurement error corrected results show that employees who leave (join) the
manufacturing sector gain (lose) a 9.7% pay increase (decrease), while a
regression on the levels shows a 5.9% pay premium for manufacturing employees.
For some industries the measurement error corrected results actually suggest
that the unmeasured labor quality is lower in the high pay industries.
There are potentially important selection problems involved in studying
workers who change industries. As a partial test for the importance of these
problems, we examined the impact on wages of changing industries separately
for leavers and joiners. The selection effects operating on workers moving
from industry i to j are likely to be different from those operating on
workers going from industry j to industry i. We were unable, however, to
reject the hypothesis that wage changes were the same for joiners and leavers.
Along with the similarity of the cross—sectional and longitudinal results, we
find this evidence supportive of the view that observed industry differences
in wages do not reflect differences in average labor quality.
8.Compensating Differentials
The finding of stable inter—industry wage differentials could be
explained by pointing to compensating differentials. The compensating
differentials argument is that agreeable and disagreeable job attributesvary
systematically with one's industry, and therefore necessitate wage
differentials to compensate employees for nonwage aspects of the industry.
Since the results considered so far do not control for working conditions, it-16-
could be argued that the industrywage differentials we observe merely
represent compensating differentials.
Although Brown (1980), Smith (1979), andseveral other studies have not
been able to documentcompensating differentials for a range of job
attributes, we examine this possibility. We baseour analysis of working
conditions on the University of Michigan's
Quality of Employment Survey (QES).
The 1977 QES cross section contains dataon a wide range of working
conditions. Several other studies ofcompensating differentials have relied
on QES, such as Preston (1985) and Brown and Medoff(1985). We focus on ten
potentially important job attributes ——weeklyhours, a variable indicating
whether health hazards are present on thejob and another indicating whether
the hazard Is serious, second and third shiftdummies, commuting time, two
variables indicating the extent of choice ofovertime, and two catch—all
variables indicating whether the physical workconditions are pleasant. These
are the same variables Brown and Medoff (1985) holdconstant.
If the industry differentials do notchange substantially once the
working condition measures are added to theregression, we would conclude that
compensating differentials are not playing an important role indetermining
the industry wage differentials.
Table 6 reports results of standardwage regressions with and without the
— tenworking condition variables. Because the QES sample is muchsmaller than
the CPS samples (1,033 usable observationscompared to more than 9,000 in
CPS), our estimates are less precise than our other results.However, as can
be seen from comparing Table 1 to Table 6 theindustry wage structure in QES
is highly correlated with our results from CPS.By comparing column (1) and—11—
column (2) of Table 6 it is clear that the working condition variables do not
substantially alter the pattern of industry wages. The standard deviation of
the industry premiums actually increases from 0.11 to 0.12 when the working
condition controls are added to the equation.
Table 7 reports occupation pay premiums with and without the ten working
condition controls. The results of this exercise are less convincing. The
standard deviation of the differentials drops from 6.2% to 4.9% once working
conditions are controlled for. These pay premiums are much less important
than industry premiums and than our earlier occupation results. However, the
attenuated occupational wage differentials may result from the imprecision in
the estimates. Even with working condition controls, the occupation variables
are statistically significant.
Another possible compensating differential is for full—time versus
part—time work. We examined this possibility by narrowing the CPS sample to
only full—time employees. The industry and occupation pay premiums in this
subsample are not substantially different from the full sample. Consequently,
we conclude that this is not a major determinant of industry and occupation
wage differentials. Lastly, variation in the risk of unemployment across
industries might provide an explanation for industry wage differences.
However, Murphy and Topel (1986) find that variables measuring the probability
and duration of unemployment do not substantially reduce the effect of
industry and occupation affiliation on wages.
Evidence considered in this subsection does not support the view that
industry and occupation wage differentials are due to omitted working
condition variables. It is not likely that the basic results reported inTable 6: Analysis of Industry Wage Premiums With and Without

































10 Working Condition Variablesa no yes
Unabiased Weighted Standard
Deviation of 2—Oigit Industry
Premiums .113 .118
R2 .496 .519
aworking condition variables include weekly hours, variables indicating
dangerous or unhealthy conditions on the job and whether the danger/threat is
serious, commuting time, second and third shift dummies, two dummies
indicating extent of choice of overtime, and two dummies indicating whether
the physical working conditions are pleasant.
bother controls include education and its square, derived experience and its
square, sex, race, 3 region dummies, tenure with employer and its square,
union status, and $ occupation dummies.
csample size is 1,033.Table 7: Analysis of Occupation Wage Premiums With and Without











































10 Working Condition Variables no yes
Unabiased Weighted Standard
Oeviation of Occupation Wage
Premiums .062 .049
Note: See Table 5 notes. Sample size equals 1,033.-18-
section 2 would change if we could control for working conditions. Indeed,
our finding that controlling for working conditions raises the dispersion of
wages suggests that looking across industries, wage differentials are
additional rather than compensating.
C.Union Threat
For many years institutional economists have stressed the role of unions
in wage determination. A recent paper in this tradition by William Dickens
(1965) argues that varying costs of union avoidance across sectors will lead
some firms to offer pay premiums to avoid unionization. Firms that find it
costly to defeat a union will offer supra—competitive wages to prevent
unionization. According to this theory, the industry's ease of defeating a
union drive has a negative relationship with wage differentials. The testable
implication of Dickens' model is that inter—industry wage variability should
be low where the threat of unionization is low.
Time series evidence does not support the union threat explanation of
industry wage differentials. Between 1970 and 1980 the percentage of workers
who were in union representation election victories fell from .6% to .2% of
the private sector workforce, yet our earlier results show that the industry
wage structure remained remarkably stable during this time period. This
finding should not be surprising in light of Sumner Slichter's (1950) finding
that the industry wage structure did not change substantially after the
passage of the Wagner Act and unprecedented unionization in the 1930's and
1940's. These results strongly suggest that the industry wage structure
exists independent of union activity.—19—
Table 8 provides additional cross—sectional evidenceon the industry wage
structure and unions. Firms in southern states have agreat legal and
cultural edge over the rest of the country inavoiding unions. In 1978, for
instance, non—southern workers were 2.5 times more likely tobelong to a union
than southern private sector wage and salary workers.Consequently, the
threat effect model predicts that industrywage differentials would be less
important for a sample of southern employees. In row (1)we present the
standard deviation of industry wage differentials in southernstates after
controlling for other factors. Contrary to the predictions of the threat
model, we find a substantial amount of variation in relativewages across
industries for this subsample, and we also find that theindustry wage
structure in the south is highly correlated with theindustry wage structure
in the rest of the country. Similar resultswere obtained using a subsample
of SMSAs with very low unionization rates. It doesnot appear that the threat
of unionization is an important explanation of theinter—industry wage
structure.
We also address the question of whetherindustry wage differentials
result from varying degrees of union bargainingpower across industries. If
the industry wage differences are due to"strong" unions who can raise wages
without suffering severe employment losses in certainindustries (i.e. because
of varying elasticity of labor demand),we would expect to find less
variability in wages across industries for nonunion workers.Rows (2) and (3)
of Table 8 show that this is not thecase. Instead, we find that nonunion
workers have slightly greater dispersion inindustry wage differentials than
union workers, and that there is a high correlationbetween industry wages forTable 8: Alternative Samples and UnionThreat
May 1984 CPS
AdjustedWeighted
Standard Deviation of Weighted Correlation Sample Industry Wage Differentialsa with Complementb
(1) Southern States .136 .91
(1.0)
(2) Nonunion Employees .148 .68
(.99)
(3) Union Employees .127 .68
- (.99)
aweights are 1984 employment.
bComplements for rows(1) through (3) are nonsouthern states, unionemployees and nonunion employees, respectively.Consistent correlations are reported in
parentheses.—20-
unionand nonunion employees.
Lastly, evidence on the industry wage structure worldwide surveyed in
Krueger and Summers (1986) militates against an explanation of industry wage
premia based on unions. Nations such as South Korea which vigorously oppose
unions have almost an identical wage structure to nations that have widespread
and legally protected collective bargaining such as England and West Germany.
Industry wage differentials •exist to about the same extent in union and
nonunion environments and in situations where the credibility of union threats
differ widely, and therefore do not appear to be a union phenomenon.
0.other Issues
A plausible way to gain further insights into the inter—industry wage
structure is to examine how it varies across different types of workers and
plants. In general, we find that inter—industry wage structure is quite
stable.
It is natural to conjecture that industry wage differences have something
to do with patterns of human capital accumulation. Firms may be forced to
share rents with older workers who have acquired substantial firm specific
capital. This would lead to inequality in wages across industries. In this
case our wage equation might not be accurately measuring inter—industry
differences in the expected lifetime income of new workers entering different
industries. In order to examine these possibilities, we examine separately
industry effects on the wages of young and old workers, and on workers with
short and long tenure. Rows (1) and (2) of Table 9 show that wage premium
across industries for the young and old are highly correlated. Furthermore,-21—
the standard deviation of industry wages is about 14 for both groups of
workers. Similarly, we find that workers with one year or less of job tenure
or more than ten years of job tenure have almost equally variable and highly
correlated industry wage structures. Varying patterns of human capital
accumulation do not appear to provide an explanation for the inter—industry
wage structure.6
An important institution that affects wages is company and plant size.
Several studies have documented sizable size-wage differentials. For our
purposes, the size—wage differential is an important dimension of the wage
structure because several explanations of the size—wage differential are based
on efficiency wages that result from more costly monitoring in larger
establishments. (SeeCalvoand Wellisz (1978), 01 (1983), and Bulow and
Summers (1986) for examples of efficiency wage models applied to different
size firms.) Rows (5) and (6) of Table 9 show that industry wage dispersion
increases sharply with firm size. This suggests that monitoring difficulties
may in fact increase with firm size in some industries. Corroborating
evidence comes from an analysis of self employed workers. Despite the fact
that skills are most likely to be diverse among the self employed, and the
substantial reporting errors in reporting self employment, inter—industry wage
variations are about one—quarter smaller among the self employed than among
other workers.
Rows (9) and (10) of Table 9 show that the industry wage structure is
fairly uniform for both blue collar and white collar employees. We also
reached the same conclusion when we examined more detailed occupations.






(1) Age 20-35 .139
(2) Age 50-65 .134
.85
Tenure
(3) Tenure 1 .087
(4) Tenure > 10 .096
.75
Firm Size
(5) 1—99 Employees .073
(6) 1,000 or More Employees .iii
.78
Types of Employment
(7) Self Employed .097
(8) Privately Employed .133
.84
Occupation
(9) Blue Collar .126
(10) White Collar .140
.63
aROWS (7) and (8) areunweighted; all other rows are weighted by 1984
employment.
bcompiement is the other reportedsubsample. Correlations are not adjusted.
cCOl are the same as -inTable1. Year dummies were also included in rows
(7) and (8).
dsample sizes for rows (1)through (10), respectively, are 4,932, 1,811,
5,116, 1,619, 3,752, 3.497, 3,378, 46,232, 3,959, and 6,335. Rows(1), (2),
(7) and (8) are 1984 CPS. Rows (3) through (6) are 1979 CPS.Rows (7) and (8)
are May 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 CPS.—22—
wage tend to pay workers in other occupations above their alternative wage as
well. This finding supports the conclusions of Dickens' and Katz's(1986)
more extensive examination of this issue. Since it is unlikely that workers
in different occupations within an industry have similar quantities of
unmeasured ability, this finding is further evidence against an unmeasured
labor quality explanation of industry wage premia. The similarity of the
industry wage structure for workers in different occupations suggests that the
factor that is responsible for industry wage differences cuts across
occupational lines.7 This may cast some doubt on efficiency wage theories
based on differences in monitoring technologies, since monitoring costs are
likely to vary somewhat across occupations. It militates in favor of
sociological explanations such as that of Akerlof (1984).
4.Direct Evidence
The previous sections were aimed at documenting substantial variations in
wages across industries and occupations that are not explained by the standard
competitive model. In this section we examine whether it is profitable to pay
these wage premia. Specifically, we test efficiency wage models that are
based on reduced turnover costs and improved performance. First we consider
the relationship between pay premiums and turnover and then we examine effort
and performance. The direct evidence that we present suggests thatwage
premiums contribute to increased employee productivity and some limited
support for efficiency wage theories.
Turnover is costly to firms. Increased quits cost the firm in terms of—23—
recruitment, lost production and lost specific training. While the
relationship between wages and turnover is well established in the literature
(see Pencavel (1970) and Viscusi (1980) for instance), we specifically examine
the relationship between turnover and industry and occupation wage premia.
Our approach to analyzing turnover is to regress tenure and quit rates on an
employee's wage premium and other controls. The wage premium is the sum of
industry and occupation wage differentials that we report in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 10 shows that the wage premium variable is a significant factor in
explaining tenure and quits. The premium variable has an impact on tenure and
quits even after controlling for individual specific wage rates. Industry
and occupation wage premia thus have a stronger impact on turnover that goes
beyond the general effect of increased wages. This finding, at a minimum,
provides further evidence that wage premiums do not reflect compensating
differentials, since such differentials would not induce reduced turnover.
The results imply that a 75% increase in the wage premium, which equals the
change in wages of moving from the lowest paid industry to the highest paid
industry in 1984, would result in an estimated 38% increase in tenure and a
63% decrease in quit rates, all elseequal. Brown and Iledoff (1978) estimate
that the elasticity of output with respect to the quit rate is about .1. This
implies that reductions in turnover alone are not sufficient to justify wage
premiums of the magnitude actually observed if labor's share is substantial.
Although this is slightly more than the impact of changing from nonunion to
union status, higher wages do not appear to bring about a big enough reduction
in turnover to justify their cost unless they bring other benefits.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































premiums on several self-reported measures of performance and job
characteristics, holding human capital, individual wages, and demographic
factors constant. For comparison, we also report the effect of union
membership on these same performance measures and job characteristics.
We find that industry and occupation premiums are postiively related to
self—reported work effort. This is true even after holding constant the level
of wages. Furthermore1 workers in better paying occupations and industries
are more likely to report that their work is "meaningful" to them and that
they think about their work during their leisure time than workers in low
paying occupations and industries. These findings suggest that wage premiums
are successful in eliciting better performance from workers.
Lastly, we find that workers in better paying industries and occupations
tend to have less repetitious work and greater freedom to determine their work
speed. While this result is contrary to an equalizing differences view of
industry and occupation wage differences, it is consistent with efficiency
wages based on varying monitoring costs since workers with greater discretion
are more difficult to monitor than workers with well defined, repetitious job
tasks.
The direct evidence reported in this section provides some support for
efficiency wage theory by showing a link between wage premiums and reduced
turnover, increased work effort, and more job discretion. It is certainly not
clear, however, that these responses to high wages are sufficiently large to
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The empirical results in this paper suggest that non—competitive
considerations play an important part in wage setting. After controlling for
labor quality and compensating differentials to the maximum extent possible
with available data we find that variables related to job characteristics but
not to workers' utility on the job have very substantial effects onwages.
Differences in industry have effects on wages that are comparable in magnitude
to the effects of unionism, firm size, sex or race. In Krueger and Summers
(1986), industry wage differences are remarkably stable over time and
remarkably similar across countries. There is some evidence that firms paying
wage premiums reap some gains in terms of lower turnover and better
performance as a result.
These results have important implications for both micro and macro
economic policy. It is well known (e.g Bhagwhati and Srinivasan (1983)) that
in the presence of inter—industry wage differentials, a variety of subsidies,
tariffs, or other protectionist policies may be desirable in the sense that
they raise total economic welfare. Bulow and Summers (1986) demonstrate that
it is even possible that subsidies to high wage industries financedby
universal lump sum taxes will represent a Pareto-improvement.Traditionally,
these results have not been thought of as having much policy relevance.
Inter—industry wage differentials have been viewed as distortions which are
best attacked directly and which may be exacerbated by second-bestpolicies.
Efficiency wage models suggest that inter-industry wage differentialsmay not
be the result of imperfections in competition but of deeper information and-25—
contractingproblems. In this case, second best industrialsubsidies may be
the only available policy instruments. Ofcourse, it is far from clear that
governments have the ability to actually use suchpolicies in a desirable way.
The demonstration of importantinter—industry wage differentials, if
accepted, creates a prima fade case for the existenceof involuntary
unemployment. Unemployment may be thought of asemployment in home
production. it is no more surprising that workersshould be confined to this
"industry" than to other low wage industries. There isa more subtle linkage
between inter—industry wage differentialsand involuntary unemployment as
well.Theexistence of wage differentials can provide themotivation for
"wait" unemployment of the type consideredby Hall (1975) and Bulow and
Summers (1986). In the presence ofinvoluntary unemployment, there is a case
for policies directed at increasingemployment. The natural rate of
unemployment is likely to be inefficiently high. As Akerlofand Yellen (1985)
emphasize, efficiency wage models can illuminatecyclical fluctuations in
unemployment as well. The finding here of largeinter—industry wage
differentials suggests that profitsmay be relatively insensitive to wages
over a wide range. This attentuates firms' incentivesto adjust wages in the
face of unemployment.
/
Theresults in this paper suggest an important directionfor future
research. The sources of noncompetitivewage differentials need to be
isolated. As Stiglitz (1984) notes, differentefficiency wage models have
somewhat different implications for a number ofpositive and normative issues.
Alternative non—competitive, non-efficiencywage theories, while difficult to
specify, undoubtedly also have differing implications.Moreover, linking wage—27—
premia to variables suggested by efficiency wage theories, if possible, would
strengthen the argument by elimination presEnted here. There are, of course,
formidable difficulties of identification so it may be necessary to rely on
case studies to test efficiency wage theories. To this end, Summers (1986)
presents a case study of Henry Ford's introduction of the five dollar day.
Alternatively, production function estimates of the type presented by Brown
and Medoff (1978) might permit estimates of at least some efficiency wage
effects.Table Al:Estimated Wage Differentials for Three—Digit CXC tndustries
——May1984 CPS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)












040 Metal mining (10)
041 Coal mining (11, 12)
042 Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction (13.)
050 Nonmetallic mining andquarrying, except fuel (14)
8 (060) CONSTRUCTIoN (15, 16, 17)
MANUFACTURING
Nondurable Goods
Foods and kindred products
100 Meat products (201)
101 Dairy products (202)
102 Canned and preserved fruits and vegetables (203)
110 Grain mill products (204)
111 Bakery products (205)
112 Sugar and confectionary products (206)
120 Beverage industries (208)
121 Miscellaneous food prepareations and kindred
products (207, 209)
122 Not specifed food industries
130 Tobacco manufacturers (21)
Textile mill products
132 Knitting mills (225)
140 Dyeing and finishing textiles, except
wool and knit goods (226)
141 Floor coverings, except hard surface (227)
142 Yarn, thread and fabric mills (228, 221—224)
150 Miscellaneous textile mill products (229)
Apparel and other finished textile products
151 Apparel and accessories, except knit (231-238)
152 Miscellaneous fabricated textile products (239)
Paper and allied products
160 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills (261—263,
161 Miscellaneous paper and pulp products (264)










































dC Industry (SIC) Differential
Printing, publishing, and allied industries
C (171) Newspaper publishing and printing (271) —.049 (.051)
172 Printing, publishing, and allied industries,
except newspapers (272—279) .123 (.037)
Chemicals arid allied products
180 Plastics, synthetics, and resins (282) .026 (.10)
181 Orugs (283) .221 (.086)
182 Soaps and cosmetics (284) .280 (.095)
190 Paints, varnishes, and related products (285) .236 (.122)
191 Agricultural chemicals -.016 (.136)
192 Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals (281,
286, 269) .290 (.047)
Petroleum and coal products
200 Petroleum refining (291) .370 (.079)
201 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products
(295, 299) .637 (.383)
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products
210 Tires and inner tubes (301) .339 (.129)
211 Other rubber products, and plastics footwear
and belting (302-304, 306) -.026 (.090)
212 Miscellaneous plastics products (307) —.006 (.052)
Leather and leather products
220 Leather tanning and finishing (311) —.107 (.382)
221 Footwear, except rubber and plastic (313,314) -.144 (.068)
222 Leather products, except footwear (315—317, 319) —.132 (.157)
Durable Goods
Lumber and wood products, except furniture
230 Logging (241) -.043 (.172)
231 Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork (242, 243) —.030 (.056)Table Al, Continued
Wage CIC Industry (SIC) Differential
Lumber and wood products, except furniture (Continued)
232 Wood buildings and mobile homes (245) —.067 (.117)
241 Miscellaneous wood products (244, 249) -.191 (.108)
242 Furniture and Fixtures (25) -.047 (.054)
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products
250 Glass and glass products (321—323) -.035 (.090)
251 Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products
(324, 327) .060 (.085)
252 Structural clay products (325) .263 (.271)
261 Pottery and related products (325) .046 (.172)
262 Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral and stone
products (328, 329) .216 (.101)
Metal industries
270 Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and
finishing mills (331) .233 (.060)
271 Iron and•Steel foundries (332) .128 (.090)
272 Primary aluminum industries (3334, Pt 334,
(3353—3355, 3361) .256 (.117)
280 Other primary metal industries (3331-3333,
33339, Pt 334, 3351, 3356, 3357, 3382,
3369, 339) .052 (.014)
281 Cutlery, hand tools, and other hardware (342) -.012 (.104)
282 Fabricated structural metal products (344) .090 (.053)
290 Screw machine products (345) .103 (.172)
291 Metal forgings and stampings (346) .000 (.088)
292 Ordnance (348) .118 (.117)
300 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products (341,
343, 347, 349) .035 (.064)
301 Not specified metal industries -.165 (.382)
Machinery, except electrical
310 Engines and turbines (351) .270 (.104)
311 Farm machinery and equipment (352) .324 (.081)
312 Construction and material handling machines (353) .145 (.070)
320 Metalworking machinery (354) .020 (.072)Table Al, Continued
Wage
dc Industry (SIC) Differential
Machinery, except electrical (Continued)
321 Office and accounting machiens (357, except 3573) .349 (.108)
322 Electronic computing equipment (3573) .243 (.044)
331 Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c. (355, 356,
358, 359) .133 (.038)
332 Not specified machinery NA NA
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies
340 Household appliances (363) —.015 (.093)
341 Radio, TV, and communication equipment (365,
366) .202 (.045)
342 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies,
n.e.c. (361, 362, 364, 367, 369) .051 (.035)
350 Not specified electrical machinery, equipment,
and supplies .498 (.382)
Transportation equipment
351 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (371) .220 (.036)
352 Aircraft and parts (372) .198 (.050)
360 Ship and boat building and repairing (313 .057 (.073)
361 Railroad locomotives and equipment (374) .230 (.270)
362 Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts (376) .180 (.061)
310 Cycles and miscellaneous transportation equipment
(375, 379) —.030 (.108)
Professional and photographic equipment,
and watches
371 Scientific and controlling instruments (381, 382).074 (.067)
372 Optical and health services supplies (383, 384,
385) .097 (.062)
380 Photographic equipment and supplies (386) .217 (.101)
381 Watches, clocks, and clockwork operated devices
(387) .321 (.271)
362 Not specified professional equipment NA NATable Al, Continued
Wage CXC Industry (SIC) Differential
390 Toys, amusement, and sporting goods (394) .104 (.088) 391 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries (39,




400 Railroads 940) .227 (.067)
401 Bus service and urban transit (41. except 412) .086 (.122)
402 Taxicab service (412) —.573 (.382)
410 Trucking service (421, 423) .079 (.050)
411 Warehousing and storage (422) —.020 (.172) 420 Water transportation (44) .087 (.112)
421 Air transportation Q45) .331 (.049)
422 Pipe lines, except natural gas (46) —.116 (.192)
432 Services incidental to transportation (47) —.037 (.073)
Communications
440 Radio and Television broadcasting (483) —.144 (.062)
441 Telephone (wire and radio) (481) .312 (.036)
442 Telegraph and miscellaneous communication
services (482, 489) .039 (.079)
Utilities and sanitary services
460 Electric light and power (491) .289 (.045)
461 Gas and steam supply systems (492, 496) .291 (.070)
462 Electric and gas, and other combinations (493) .319 (.074)
470 Water supply and irrigation (494, 497) .083 (.129)
471 Sanitary services (495) .455 (.382)
472 Not specified utilities .494 (.271)
WHOLESALE TRADE
Durable Goods
600 Motor Vehicles and equipment (501) —.013 (.084)
501 Furniture and home furnishings (502) .066 (.122)Table Al, Continued
Wage
dc Industry (SIC) Differential
502 Lumber and construction materials (503) .123 (.104)
510 Sporting goods, toys, and hobby goods (504) .178 (.210)
511 Metals and minerals, except petroleum (505) .119 (.146)
512 Electrical goods (506) .107 (.061)
521 Hardware, plumbing and heating supplies (507) .039 (.076)
522 Not specified electrical and hardware products NA NA
530 Machinery, equipment, and supplies .073 (.041)
531 Scrap and waste materials (5093) .109 (.136)
532 Miscellaneous wholesale, durable goods (5094, ????) .185 (.172)
Nondurable Goods
540 Paper and paper products (511) .011 (.122)
541 Drugs, chemicals, and allied products (512, 516) -.024 (.082)
542 Apparel, fabrics, and notions (513) .092 (.137)
550 Groceries and relatedproducts (514) -.020 (.057)
551 Farm products——raw materials (515) -.146 (.090)
552 Petroleum products (517) .182 (.078)
560 Alcoholic beverages (518) .072 (.108)
581 Farm supplies (5191) .055 (.113)
582 Miscellaneous wholesale, nondurablegoods (5194,
5198, 5199) .041 (.104)
571 Not specified wholesale trade .354 (.270)
RETAIL TRADE
580 Lumber and building material retailing (521, 523) —.119 (.061)
581 Hardware stores (525) -.305 (.068)
582 Retail nurseries and garden stores (526) -.121 (.129)
590 Mobile home dealers (527) -.276 (.192)
0 (591) Department stores (531) —.203 (.031)
592 Variety stores (533) —.138 (.098)
600 Miscellaneous general merchandise stores (539) —.266 (.117)
E (601) Grocer stores (541) -.144 (.032)
602 Dairy products stores (245) —.234 (.157)
610 Retail bakeries (546) —.145 (.095)
611 Food stores, n.e.c. (52, 543, 544, 549) —.282 (.086)
612 Motor vehicle dealers (551, 552) -.023 (.040)
620 Auto and home supply stores (553) -.105 (.067)
621 Gasoline service stations (554) -.278 (.061)
622 Miscellaneous vehicle dealers (555, 556. 557, 559)—.258 (.122)Table Al, Continued
Wage dc Industry (SIC) Differential
630 Apparel and accessory stores, except shoe (56,
except 566) —.237 (.042)
631 Shoe stores (566) —.237 (.086)
632 Furniture and home furnishings stores (571) —.112 (.062)
640 Household appliances, TV, and radio stores (572,
573) —.172 (.061)
F (641) Eating and drinking places (58) -.213 (.083)
642 Drug stores (591) —.258 (.047)
650 Liquor stores (592) -.488 (.088)
651 Sporting goods, bicycles, and hobby stores (5941,
-5945,5946) —.338 (.098)
652 Book and stationery stores (5942, 5943) —.199 (.104)
660 Jewelry stores (5944) —.094 (.082)
661 Sewing, needlework, and piece goods stores (5949) —.403 (.123)
662 Mail order houses (5961) -.287 (.108)
670 Vending machine operators (5962) -.174 (.157)
671 Direct selling establishments (5963) .117 (.095)
672 Fuel and ice dealers (598) -.284 (.172)
681 Retail florists (5992) -.173 (.086)
682 Miscellaneous retail stores (593, 5947, 5948,
5993, 5994, 5999) -.121 (.060)
691 Not specified retail trade —.041 (.382)
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE
6 (700) Banking (60) .048 (.031)
701 Savings and loan associations (612) .082 (.059)
702 Credit agencies, n.e.c. (61, except 612) .045 (.056)
710 Security, commodity brokerage, and investment
companies (62, 67) .175 (.056)
H (711) Insurance (63, 64) .107 (.034)
712 Real estate, including real estate—insurance—law
offices (65, 66) .005 (.034)
BUSINESS AND REPAIR SERVICES
721 Advertising (731) .087 (.076)
722 Services to be dwellings and other buildings (734)—.160 (.054)
130 Commercial research, development, and testing
labs (7391, 7397) .209 (.081)
731 personnel suply services (736) —.142 (.052)
732 Business management and consulting services (737) .015 (.064)
740 Computer and data processing services (737) .220 (.054)Table Al, Continued
Wage
CIC Industry (SIC) Differential
741 Detective and protective services (7393) .015 (.071)
742 Business services, n.e.c. (732, 733, 735, 7394,
7395, 7396, 7399) —.029 (.044)
750 Automotive services, except repair (751, 752, 754)—.079 (.101)
751 Automotive repair shops (762, 7694) .034 (.051)
752 Electrical Repair Shops (762) .220 (.122)
760 Miscellaneous repair services (763,764, 7692, 7699) -.030 (.061)
PERSONAL SERVICES
J (761) Private households (88) —.388 (.100)
762 Hotels and motels (701) —.168 (.034)
770 Lodging places, except hotels and motels (702,
703, 704) —.510 (.115)
771 Laundry, cleaning, and garment services (721) —.285 (.059)
772 Beauty shops (723) -.057 (.050)
780 Barber shops (724) —.054 (.191)
781 Funeral service and crematories (726) -.268 (.116)
782 Shoe repair shops (725) NA NA
790 Dressmaking shops (pt 729) -.561 (.271)
791 Miscellaneous personal services (722, Pt 729) —.243 (.083)
ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION SERVICES
800 Theaters and motion pictures (18, 792) —.074 (.069)
801 Bowling alleys, billiard and pool parlors (793) —.417 (.122)
802 Miscellaneous entertainment and recreation
services (791, 794, 799) —.167 (.043)
PROFESSIONAL AND RELATED SERVICES
812. Offices of physicians (801, 803) -.082 (.041)
820 Offices of dentists (802) .053 (.057)
821 Offices of chiropractors (8041) -.354 (.172)
822 Offices of optometrists (8042) —.335 (.271)
830 Offices of health practitioners, n.e.c. (8049) —.436 (.271)
K (831) Hospitals (806) .055 (.026)
832 Nursing and personal care facilities (805) —.142 (.032)
840 Health services, n.e.c. (807, 808, 809) —.020 (.047)
841 Legal services (81) .072 (.045)
L (842) Elementary and secondary schools (821) —.225 (.040)
M (850) Colleges and universities (822) —.147 (.040)Table Al, Continued
CIC Industry (SIC) Wage
Differential
851 Business, trade, and vocational schools
852 Libraries (823)
-.139 (.129)




Job training and vocational rehabilitation
services (833)







Residential care facilities, without nursing
(836)





872 Museums, art galleries, and zoos (84)
-.178 (.049)
880 Religious organizations (866)
-.144 (.192)
881 Membership organizations (861—865, 869)
(.040)
882 Engineering, architectural, and surveying
services (891)
—.077 (.055)
890 Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
(892)
.186 (.051)
891 Noncommercial educational and scientific
research (892)
.043 (.056)






WeightedAdjusted Standard Oeviation .164
Note: Controls are the same as in Table 1.-28—
APPENDIX
CORRECTING FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR IN DUMMY VARIABLES IN
LONGITUDINAL DATA
Under usual assumptions, measurement error bias is exacerbated in
longitudinal data because random misclassification in both periods increases
noise while a smaller number of changers reduces signal. Due to the
restricted status of a dummy variable, measurement error is correlated with
the change in a dummy variable in fixed effects models. Freeman (1984)
derives the correction for measurement in this case. The effect of
m!asurement error on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive dummy
variables is a more complicated problem because the measurement error is
correlated across the dummy variables. In this appendix we derive the
correction for measurement error in more than one dummy variable in
longitudinal data. The procedure is then applied to adjust the estimated
fixed effects results in Section 3.
We have the following problem. In either time period an individual can
belong to one of k+1 industries. If a worker joins industry i, the change in
dummy variable i is 1; if he leaves industry i the change in dummy variable i
registers a —1; and if he remains in industry I both periods or never is in
industry I, the change in dummy variable registers a 0. For simplicity, we
assume the true model is equation (1), where the change in log wage AW is a
function of k industry dummy variables AD*, and a random disturbance Ae. a is
the, vector of coeficients we want to estimate. All k+1 industry dummies
cannot be in equation (1) because they are colinear -—ifyou leave one
industry you must join another. Since the change in industry status is—29—
probably orthogonal to the change in other
independent variables, such as
marital status and education,equation (1) is a reasonable approximation.
(1) aW =AD*a+Ac
The measurement error problem arises because industry status isreported
with error in both time periods.For industry i we know thereported AD1,
which is the true change in statusplus the classification error,
e1.
—2






Following Freeman (1984), we assume thatmeasurement error is independent
over time and random. We further assume thatthe measurement error is
proportional to the industry's size and thattransitions from industry i to j
equaltransitions from .5toI.Under these assumptions, the distributionof
e1 conditional upon the true transition is reported in TableA2 below. In the
table r11 is the weightedprobability an employee who is not in industry I is
misclassified in industry i, whilerIT is the probability of being classified
as not in industry i conditionalupon being in industry i. is the true
transition probability. The expected valueof ei is equation (3):
(3) E(e.) =—(r .+ r)AD* 1 •j,i 1,1 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































where is an orthogonal disturbance.
In matrix notation we have:
(5) AU =AU*[I_R]+v
where: R =Kx K diagonal matrix with (r .+ r.)onthe diagonal.
1,1 1,1
I=Kx K identity matrix.
v =Matrixof disturbances which are orthogonal to AD*.




From equation (6) it can be seen that an 01.5 regression of M.d on AD
yields a biased and inconsistent estimate of the wage differentials a because




A proof of equation (7) is straightforward and useful for deriving the
standard errors of the estimates. The proof is as follows. Substitution of
the OLS estimate foraOLS in equation (7) yields the following equation.
=
Andsubstitution of the true model, equation (1), for Aw in the above
equation gives
=(AD*1AD*il(AD1AD)[J_Rf'[(ADTAD)AD1(Ao*a+Ac)].
Finally, substituting AD' =(I_RJ'AD*'+uland cancelling terms results
in equation (8).(This result relies on the fact that [I—R] is a diagonal—31—
matrix.) The probability limit of (8) is a, and thus equation (7) is a
consistent estimator.
(8) a =a+(I-R]1(AD*'AD*i1{[I_R]1aD*1ag +v'AO*a+v'Ae}
Standard Errors
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, V of a is E[(a—a)(a-a)'J. This
is presented in equation (9), where A =[I_R]1(AD*'AD*).This relies on the
assumption that Ac is iid.
(9) V =A(av'v
+v'AD*aa'AO*v + a[I-RJ2AD*'Ao*)A'
All of the terms of equation (9) can be estimated given informationon
AD*'AO*, Aw, and AD, except for v'AD*a&AD*v.l However, ignoring this term
will not have an important effect on V if, as is usually the case with
longitudinal data, the variance of the noise is small relative to the residual
variance.
The standard errors of the coefficients are the square root of the
diagonal elements of (9).
Application
In order to apply the correction technique we need an estimate of the
misclassification probabilities and the moment matrix of the trueindustry
change variables, Ao*tAD*. The moment matrix of reported changers, AD'AD is
known. Mellow and Sider (1983) estimate that 7.7 ofemployee responses to
the industry question in CPS do not match employerresponses to the same-32-
question for major industries. However, notall of these responses are
employee errors. In fact, Mellow and Siderreport some evidence that
employers frequently misreport theiremployees' industry.
We use 5* as a rough estimate of randommisclassification in reported
industry status, r. Wefurther assume that r. is proportional to the 1,1 1,3
sizeof industry j. The i,jth off—diagonalelement of AD*'AD* is the negative
of the number of movers fromindustry i to j or j to i, while diagonal element
i,i is the total number of joiners to i andleavers from i. We adjust 8D'AD
for spurious joiners and leavers toderive aD*o*. Workers who truly
switched industry status are assumed tocorrectly report their industry
status. Under these assumptions, the numberof misclassified movers from
industry i to j or 3 to i is:
2(1-r. )N(T. .r. +1..r.. j. 1,11,1 I,J•j,j •3,i
Theprobability of remaining in industry i both periods,T11 is approximated by
the reported probability ofremaining in industry i both periods.—33—
Footnotes
1. In a recent paper, Dickens and Lang (1985) examine the returns to
education and experience across sectors. Their estimating technique allows for
the simultaneous determination of the worker's sector and the characteristics
of the sectors. As a result they can test whether primary sector jobs are
rationed. They conclude that returns to experience and education differ
across sectors, and that some workers are involuntarily confined to secondary
sector jobs.
2. All results were qualitatively the same when the full 1979 sample was
used.
3. Since the wage regressions include a constant, we treat the omitted
industry variable as having a zero effect on wages, calculate the employment-
weighted average of wage differentials for all industries, and report the
difference between the industry differentials and the weighted average. The
resulting statistics are the proportionate difference in wages between an
employee in a given industry and the average employee.
4.We return to the effects of unions in Section 3C.
5. To crudely adjust the variances for sampling error, we subtract the
weighted average of the sampling variances of the differentials from the
unadjusted variance. The raw correlations are biased for the same reason the
standard deviation is biased. As a result, we adjust the correlation
coefficient of differentials across samples by multiplying them by the ratio
of the biased standard deviation to the unbiased standard deviations. This
procedure can be shown to produce a slight underestimate of the variance of-34-
the true industry wage differentials because of its neglect ofcovar-iance
terms.
6.Note also that these findings bely human capital explanationsholding
that differences in the level of wages across industries are causedby
differences in the slope of age or tenure wage profiles.
7. can be estimated from available data because plim =a2 Ac Au Ac
+
aOLS1)oLs (a [I_R]aOLS) AD AD(a_[I_R]aOLS); and E(v'v) =
ADAD -ADAD [1-RJ a is estimated from (7).—35-
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